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A B S T R A C T
Increasing attention is being paid to the use of policy instruments in promoting progressive waste management
and supporting the transition to a circular economy. To be eﬀective in this context, instruments must be ba-
lanced, providing the correct amount of sanction and incentive to ensure environmental protection, enhance
resource recovery, and promote innovation and investment in beneﬁcial technologies. Focusing on the UK
landﬁll tax, and adopting a stakeholder-oriented approach, this paper presents a case study illustrating how the
ineﬀective implementation of secondary legislation can have unintended consequences on the aims of primary
legislation. Speciﬁcally, it examines the Landﬁll Tax (Qualifying Fines) Order 2015 (QFO), which introduced a
Loss On Ignition (LOI) test regime to classify ﬁnes for tax purposes. Results from a stakeholder survey (n=44)
revealed that the introduction of the QFO has dis-incentivised material recovery and discouraged investment in
separation technologies, thereby creating a perverse incentive to landﬁll waste. Major weaknesses identiﬁed
include the poorly deﬁned LOI test regime, the timing of and responsibility for conducting LOI testing, the lack of
compliance checks, and the marked discontinuity in tax rates at the somewhat arbitrary 10% LOI threshold.
Furthermore, the system was widely viewed to be open to abuse by unscrupulous traders. A set of re-
commendations are made to address these shortcomings, where it is proposed that the LOI threshold should be
replaced by multiple tax bands or a sliding scale and ideally combined with a direct incentive for investment
such as an enhanced capital allowance for resource eﬃcient technologies.
1. Introduction
Transitioning from a linear to a Circular Economy (CE) could
overcome consequences of unsustainable consumption such as en-
vironmental degradation, resource depletion, and climate change
(Moreno et al., 2016). A CE mimics a natural biological system by re-
circulating resources through successive generations, where resource
eﬃciency is promoted through the optimisation of production systems,
resource utility is maintained by extracting the maximum value when
in use, and any remaining value at end-of-life is recovered through
progressive waste management strategies (Smol et al., 2015).
There is now growing attention on the role of policy in delivering
the CE. Soderman et al. (2016) notes that the European Union (EU) is
increasingly recognising the role of policy in supporting the transition
from end-of-pipe waste management to eﬃcient resource management,
whilst Jimenez-Rivero and Garcia-Navarro (2017) highlight the need
for government to strengthen and enforce instruments that adhere to CE
principles. One CE-aligned approach is the use of Extended Producer
Responsibility (EPR), which places responsibility for end-of-life
management with the producer (Lindhqvist, 2000). Currently the use of
EPR (in the EU and elsewhere, e.g. Mrkajić et al., 2018; Wang et al.,
2018) is restricted at a practical level to packaging waste, waste elec-
trical and electronic equipment, end-of-life vehicles, and hazardous
household wastes (Lifset et al., 2013). For an ideal CE approach, this
would extend to up-stream issues such as eco-design, along with full
internalisation of waste management costs to shift responsibility from
taxpayers and local authorities to companies and consumers (Lifset
et al., 2013). While this may be realised in the future, during the
transition end-of-pipe waste management remains a key concern. In-
deed, EU policy initiatives, the most recent being the ‘Circular Economy
Package (CEP)’ (2015-ongoing; European Commission EC, 2016), place
an increased emphasis on both CE models and the eﬃcient use of
wastes (Gregson et al., 2015; Smol et al., 2015).
With respect to waste management, two key EU directives are the
Waste Framework Directive (WFD) (2008/98/EC), which introduces
the waste hierarchy and sets recycling targets, and the Landﬁll
Directive (LD) (1999/31/EC), which sets targets requiring a reduction
in the landﬁlling of biodegradable and other polluting solid wastes
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(European Commission EC, 2008, 1999). Both the WFD and the LD have
been amended by the CEP, which reiterates the waste hierarchy,
strengthens recycling targets, and extends landﬁll diversion targets to
include all municipal wastes (European Commission EC, 2015a,b).
Although all member states are obliged to transpose EU directives
into national policy, economic and social diﬀerences between countries
are reﬂected in the disparity of waste management systems employed
(Mihai and Apostol, 2012; Pires et al., 2011). Concerning landﬁll di-
version, several countries have achieved very low landﬁlling rates,
where this has been attributed to eﬀective national policy and the use of
ﬁscal measures such as Landﬁll Taxes (LFTs) (European Environment
Agency EEA, 2000; Mazzanti et al., 2009).
While LFTs have been successful in diverting waste from landﬁll, to
what extent they promote material recovery is less clear. The ﬁnancial
competitiveness of secondary materials can be enhanced through
taxation on competing virgin materials or on waste disposal, where
Solderholm (2011) argues that the latter can be more eﬀective due to
low administration costs and increased policy acceptance. However,
Martin and Scott (2003) found that while the United Kingdom (UK) LFT
had increased landﬁll diversion, it had been less successful in pro-
moting the top waste hierarchy priorities. Likewise, in an EU-wide
study, Mazzanti and Zoboli (2008) concluded that while LFTs can lead
to the management of waste being promoted up the waste hierarchy (to
recovery or recycling), they do not create a backwards incentive to
reduce waste generation. To address such issues, researchers have
called for a re-framing of the waste hierarchy in terms of resource use
and productivity, arguing that this would help policy makers ensure
that they not only disincentivise disposal, but also adequately in-
centivise preferred environmental options (Gharfalkar et al., 2015; Van
Ewijk and Stegemann, 2014).
Another factor that requires consideration is the evolution of policy
instruments in response to technological advancements in waste pro-
cessing, with particular attention paid to the interaction between the
negative externalities of pollution and the positive externalities of
technological innovation (Leme et al., 2014; Luz et al., 2015). Jaﬀe
et al. (2003) argue that policies targeting pollution reduction should
also support technological change. Thus, there is a case for combining
environmental taxes with direct incentives if the signal from a single
instrument is insuﬃcient to promote innovation and adoption of ben-
eﬁcial technologies (Jaﬀe et al., 2005). Likewise, Bennear and Stavins
(2007) argue that in such “second-best” settings, which are common in
the area of environmental and resource management, the use of mul-
tiple instruments is both the norm and justiﬁable. However, they also
caution that this requires a high level of policy coordination, which may
extend to an instrument designed to address one issue being modiﬁed in
light of another to achieve an overall positive outcome (Bennear and
Stavins, 2007).
While the design of appropriate policy instruments is clearly im-
portant, it is equally important to ensure the desired impact is achieved
through eﬀective implementation (Soderman et al., 2016). In this
context, Bailey and Rupp (2005) contend that implementation cannot
be fully understood or improved without due consideration of stake-
holder perspectives, arguing that industry is uniquely placed to make a
valuable contribution towards understanding the strengths and weak-
nesses of environmental policy instruments. Indeed, numerous stake-
holder-related factors have been identiﬁed that could undermine im-
plementation, including a lack of competent staﬀ, ineﬀective
administrative capabilities, incoherent or uncomprehensive written
documentation, poor inter-organisational communication and support,
a lack of cooperation, and competing priorities (Bailey and Rupp, 2005;
Khan and Khandaker, 2016; Mosannenzadeh et al., 2017; McTigue
et al., 2018). In relation to the latter point, Bailey and Rupp (2005)
found that eco-taxes may be counter-productive if a reduction in prof-
itability leads to the de-prioritisation of environmental issues. This
again highlights the need to ﬁnd a balance between competing prio-
rities (or multiple market failures) in waste management policy in order
to encourage development of optimal systems. Otherwise, under-reg-
ulation may lead to the careless handling of wastes, while over-reg-
ulation, regulation that is unclear, or an absence of compensatory in-
centives, may hinder the re-use of waste materials by creating excessive
bureaucracy and stiﬂing innovation (Gharfalkar et al., 2015; Jaﬀe et al.,
2005).
This paper presents a case study illustrating how the ineﬀective
implementation of secondary legislation can have unintended con-
sequences on achieving the aims of primary legislation. Focusing on the
UK LFT, it employs a stakeholder survey to examine how the in-
troduction of the Landﬁll Tax (Qualifying Fines) Order 2015 (QFO)
(House of Commons HoC, 2015), a statutory instrument used to classify
waste, has impacted on stakeholders. Expanding on a preliminary
analysis (Fletcher et al., 2017) it examines how the QFO may disin-
centivise material recovery and thereby limit landﬁll diversion, where
consideration is given to potential modiﬁcations that would ensure
suﬃcient environmental protection while enhancing the economic
viability of waste processing. The paper is structured as follows. Section
2 outlines the development of the UK LFT and QFO. Section 3 details
the methods used to conduct the analysis. Section 4 discusses stake-
holder views on the design and implementation of the QFO, high-
lighting barriers to material recovery and landﬁll diversion, and sug-
gesting potential policy developments. Finally, Section 5 reviews the
wider implications and conclusions of the study.
2. The UK landﬁll tax
The UK LFT facilitates the implementation of the LD (Calaf-Forn
et al., 2014; Morris et al., 2000), and was introduced in the 1996 Fi-
nance Act (HM Stationary Oﬃce HMSO, 1996) and modiﬁed in the
Landﬁll Tax (Amendment) Regulation 2009 (HM Stationary Oﬃce
HMSO, 2009). A regulatory incentive administrated by Her Majesty’s
Revenue and Customs (HMRC), the LFT applies diﬀerential tax rates to
wastes disposed of to landﬁll in order to reﬂect the environmental
burden of this disposal option (Calaf-Forn et al., 2014; Grigg and Read,
2001; Morris et al., 2000). It deﬁnes inert (or inactive) waste, which
qualiﬁes for a lower tax rate, as non-hazardous (as described by the
WFD), with a low Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emission potential (not bio-
degradable) and low polluting potential (contaminants unlikely to be-
come mobile or leach). Any waste that does not conform to these cri-
teria is classed as active and is liable for the standard tax rate (HMRC,
2016a). In accordance with Section 42(2) of the Finance Act 1996(a), a
deﬁnitive list of materials that were deemed to meet the deﬁnition of
inert waste (for the purposes of setting the LFT rate, and based on well
characterised properties) was published. Originally delivered through
the Landﬁll Tax (Qualifying Materials) Order 1996 (QMO) and updated
in 2011, the materials listed include; naturally occurring materials
(rocks, sand and soils), low activity processed materials (glass, ceramics
or concrete), processed or prepared minerals (silica, mica or clay),
furnace slags, ash, low activity inorganic compounds, calcium sulphate,
and calcium hydroxide (including brine) (House of Commons HoC,
2011, 1996).
When ﬁrst introduced, the LFT rates were £2/tonne for inert waste
and £7/tonne for active waste, thus with gate fees of around £5–£15
(ENDS, 1994) total disposal costs remained relatively low. As such, the
LFT provided little ﬁnancial incentive for diversion and had minimal
eﬀect on the amount of waste being disposed to landﬁll (Martin and
Scott, 2003). To address this legislative failure, the LFT escalator was
introduced (HM Treasury, 1999; Martin and Scott, 2003), where the
price of landﬁlling active waste increased by a ﬁxed amount each year
from 2000 to 2014. Since 2015, both the active and inert tax rates have
been index linked (HMRC, 2016b), standing at £84.40/tonne for active
waste and £2.65/tonne for inert waste in 2016/17 (HMRC, 2016a).
Although gate fees have also increased (partly reﬂecting improved
landﬁll management practices) they have been relatively stable since
2008, with a mean of £22/tonne in 2016 (The Waste and Resources
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Action Programme WRAP, 2009, 2017). Thus, for active waste the tax
liability now clearly exceeds other disposal costs, and the total disposal
cost (around £106/tonne) is considerably higher than that for inert
waste (around £25/tonne).
The LFT is applied to all non-exempt wastes, with the standard rate
typically applied to Municipal Solid Waste (MSW) and hazardous waste,
and the lower rate typically applied to Construction and Demolition (C
&D) waste (Conran, 2017). While suﬃcient data is not available to
assess the impact of the LFT on all waste streams, it is available for
MSW (Fig. 1), where it can be seen that the LFT escalator incentivised a
dramatic reduction in landﬁlling of around 50% between 2000 and
2013, with a concomitant ﬁvefold increase in other waste treatment
methods (Eurostat, 2016; HMRC, 2016a). Indeed, in the management of
MSW the removal of recyclable materials, such as glass, high-grade
plastics and metals, is now routine (Beccali et al., 2001; Santibanez-
Aguilar et al., 2013). Likewise, combustibles (e.g. low-grade plastics
and textiles) are often separated and used as refuse derived fuel (Násner
et al., 2017; Vountatsos et al., 2016), while biodegradable materials
(e.g. food and garden wastes) are often removed and composted or used
in energy generation (Santibanez-Aguilar et al., 2013). This has been
achieved through source segregation and more recently through tech-
nological separation at mechanical biological treatment and material
recovery facilities (Cook et al., 2015; Vountatsos et al., 2016), where
such approaches are also employed in the management of C&D and
other wastes. While advanced processing methods have delivered gains
in material and energy recovery, they have not delivered (and cannot
deliver) full recovery, where landﬁll disposal remains the preferred
option for residual waste streams (Beccali et al., 2001; Santibanez-
Aguilar et al., 2013). Thus, in addition to a reduction in the amount of
landﬁlled waste, another consequence of technological advancement
has been a change in the nature of wastes sent to landﬁll, with an in-
creasing contribution from ‘ﬁnes’ (the small fragments that remain after
processing via a mechanical treatment such as trommel screens, HMRC,
2016a). As the composition of ﬁnes is highly variable, being dependent
on both the composition of the input waste and the separation techni-
ques employed (Dias et al., 2012), this change in the nature of landﬁlled
waste has given rise to a key question regarding the classiﬁcation of
ﬁnes as either active or inactive.
As ﬁnes are often processed from a mixed waste (and therefore
contain a mixture of materials), even those arising from waste streams
dominated by inert materials (e.g. C&D waste) may not consist of
qualifying materials (listed as inert in the QMO) in their entirety (Balch,
2014). While the QMO does make allowance for the presence of a
‘small’ amount of active waste, known as ‘incidentals’, what constitutes
a small amount is not clearly deﬁned. Indeed, only generic guidance is
provided, that “whether an amount of standard-rated waste [i.e. active
waste that is liable for the standard tax rate] is small will depend on the
circumstances and is a matter of fact and degree. As a guide, the dic-
tionary deﬁnition of small is either small in size or weight, or insig-
niﬁcant or unimportant” (HMRC, 2016a). Thus, in the absence of a
clear deﬁnition, what emerged in practice was a relatively informal
system, where the responsibility of determining whether an amount of
incidental material qualiﬁed as small rested with the landﬁll operator
(HMRC, 2016a). As such, the classiﬁcation of ﬁnes has been strongly
debated within the waste industry, with concerns that the lower rate of
tax was not being applied equitably and that more clarity was required
concerning liability (Balch, 2014; Goulding, 2015a,b).
To address these concerns, the waste industry was consulted on
proposed secondary legislation to use a standardised Loss On Ignition
(LOI) test to classify ﬁnes where an LOI of 10% or less would indicate
inert material with a ‘small’ amount of contamination (HMRC, 2014a).
Overall, respondents agreed with the proposal, but raised concerns re-
garding conformity of ﬁnes to the QMO, time required for businesses to
adjust, the 10% LOI limit, and operational aspects of the LOI test
(HMRC, 2014b). A number of revisions were made in response, in-
cluding a prescribed LOI testing regime, and the QFO was introduced
where responsibility and liability for implementation was placed pri-
marily with the landﬁll operator, but where correct classiﬁcation of
ﬁnes was also dependent on information provided by the waste pro-
cessor (Fig. 2).
While the QFO provided a degree of clarity on the classiﬁcation of
ﬁnes, debate continued regarding the economic and practical realities
of implementation (Balch, 2014; Coll, 2015). The QFO has seen some
materials that may have qualiﬁed as inert (based on the QMO and the
interpretation of a ‘small’ amount of incidentals) now classed as active
waste unless proven otherwise, creating uncertainty and scepticism
amongst operators (Balch, 2014; Coll, 2015). Furthermore, while the
QFO has encouraged further material recovery in some cases (e.g. re-
moval of metal fragments from C&D derived ﬁnes to reduce the total
weight of ﬁnes sent to landﬁll), it has been suggested that in other cases
it may reduce the ﬁnancial viability of recycling operations, thereby
acting contrary to the intended incentive (Coll, 2015).
These issues are further compounded by concerns regarding the
reliability of the LOI test regime (Goulding, 2016, 2015a,b). While the
prescribed sampling method attempts to homogenise loads, Goulding
(2015a,b) has provided anecdotal evidence that it can be manipulated.
Similarly, Goulding (2016, 2015a) cites concerns raised by test provi-
ders regarding diﬀering interpretation of the LOI test method and the
consistency of data produced.
3. Materials and methods
Considering the ongoing areas of debate regarding the QFO, a
survey of waste management stakeholders was conducted to solicit
Fig. 1. Impact of the UK landﬁll tax on the management of Municipal Solid Waste. The landﬁll tax liability for standard-rated materials is from HMRC (2016a). Waste
management data are from Eurostat (2016).
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views on the implementation of the QFO with a focus on the LOI testing
regime. Speciﬁcally, the survey sought to ascertain opinions regarding
previously identiﬁed issues and potential proposed solutions in order to
inform recommendations for policy development.
The survey instrument was an online self-administered ques-
tionnaire created and published using SurveyMonkey (see Appendix A1
in Supplementary material for a full copy). Questionnaire development
was informed by industry literature (Balch, 2014; Coll, 2015; Goulding,
2016, 2015a,b) and discussions on ﬁnes management at an open
meeting hosted by the Chartered Institute for Waste Managers (CIWM)
on 4th March 2016 at the Cotton Exchange, Liverpool, UK. Key issues
identiﬁed included impacts on workplace resource requirements (Balch,
2014; Coll, 2015), a lack of support for implementation, and poor re-
liability of the testing regime (Goulding, 2016; 2015a,b). These points
were reiterated at the CIWM meeting, where a number of potential
modiﬁcations were also proposed, including the introduction of addi-
tional tax bands or spike allowances, laboratory accreditation, and
third-party sampling.
A qualifying question was employed to ensure only stakeholders
whose work related to or was impacted by the LOI testing regime
proceeded. To enable categorisation of responses by stakeholder
groups, qualifying respondents were ﬁrst asked questions regarding
their sector and the nature of their connection to the production,
management, or testing of ﬁnes. This was followed by questions ad-
dressing the perceived impact of the LOI testing regime on workplace
resource requirements, opinions regarding issues identiﬁed with the
LOI testing regime, and opinions regarding the proposed potential
modiﬁcations.
The questionnaire employed closed questions with optional open
comment boxes to instigate elaboration. Opinions were measured using
Likert-type rating scales (Likert, 1932), where the response format was
selected to minimise the risk of introducing bias and followed the re-
commendation of Revilla et al. (2014) to employ a ﬁve point fully la-
belled scale with a neutral midpoint for opinion measurement in the
general population. To ensure respondents were not forced to specify an
opinion, thereby introducing a response bias (Friedman and Amoo,
1999), ‘don’t know’ and ‘not applicable’ (N/A) options were also in-
cluded. While such responses are commonly excluded from analysis,
doing so without consideration of potential consequences can lead to
biased results and lost information (Kroh, 2006; Wang, 1997). Here all
‘don’t know’ and the majority of ‘N/A’ responses were considered to
reﬂect either a genuine lack of knowledge on the subject and/or cases
where the topic did not apply to the respondent, and were excluded.
However, ‘N/A’ responses regarding the impact of the LOI testing re-
gime on resource requirements were retained and treated as equivalent
to a neutral response.
Fig. 2. The process for determining the appropriate landﬁll tax rate for residual ﬁnes in accordance with the Landﬁll Tax (Qualifying Fines) Order 2015. Based on the
guidance provided by HMRC (2016a).
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An invitation to participate was sent to 311 individual email ad-
dresses, comprising 27 CIWM meeting delegates and 294 addresses
identiﬁed from web searches for waste management organisations
(within a 15-mile radius of 24 UK urbanisations), commercial labora-
tories oﬀering LOI testing, and waste research groups. The ques-
tionnaire link, with accompanying invitation, was also featured in the
CIWM newsletter, Skip Hire magazine, and member communications of
the United Resource Operatives Consortium. The invitation informed
respondents about the purpose of the study, anonymity of responses,
and intended publication of results with key recommendations. To
enhance response rates an incentive was oﬀered, whereby respondents
could opt in to a prize draw. In total 44 complete responses were re-
ceived in the period 9th June to 1st August 2016. This is consistent with
similar surveys within waste management, which have received 12–35
responses (Eskandari et al., 2012; Glew et al., 2013).
Quantitative data from the closed questions were analysed using
Microsoft Excel 2013 and SPSS (v.22) to produce frequency distribu-
tions and to test for diﬀerences between stakeholder groups. There is
marked variation in practice and debate in the literature regarding the
appropriate statistical analysis of Likert-type data (Bishop and Herron,
2015; Cariﬁo and Perla, 2008; Jamieson, 2004). As this study is ex-
ploratory in nature, with analysis carried out at the level of individual
questions, a conservative approach was adopted and the data was
treated as ordinal, with the nonparametric Pearson’s Chi-Square (X2)
statistic used to test for diﬀerences between groups (Jamieson, 2004;
McHugh, 2012). Unless otherwise stated, diﬀerences between groups
were insigniﬁcant. Qualitative data (comments from open comment
boxes) were used to enrich the quantitative responses and to identify
areas of agreement and conﬂict.
4. Results and discussion
4.1. Respondent proﬁle
Table 1 presents a breakdown of respondents categorised by orga-
nisation type and connection to the LOI testing regime. Of the 30 re-
spondents who provided their job title, all held managerial or profes-
sional positions (Oﬃce of National Statistics, ONS, 2010). Overall, the
respondent proﬁle demonstrates that expert opinion from within the
waste industry and associated sectors contributed to the survey, in-
dicating good representation for the results.
4.2. Workplace resource requirements
Two-thirds of respondents reported some increase in resource re-
quirements when the LOI testing regime was introduced, where the
most frequently cited were an increased time requirement and paper-
work burden. Group 1 were signiﬁcantly more impacted than group 2,
reﬂecting their direct engagement in the management of ﬁnes
(Table 2).
Around two-ﬁfths of respondents reported an increase in ﬁnancial
resource requirements, including capital expenditure and/or
Table 1
Respondent proﬁle categorised according to their connection to the manage-
ment of ﬁnes.
Group 1: Direct connection
(n= 27)
Group 2: Indirect connection (n= 17)
Production and disposal of ﬁnes Policy development & regulation, auxiliary
services, research.
Waste processing (16) Policy development & regulation (4)
Landﬁll operation (5) Waste consultancy (4)
Internal policy compliance (6) Test provider (6)
Waste machinery supplier (1)
Academic research (2)
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operational costs. One respondent who identiﬁed a neutral impact on
capital expenditure noted that it might be required in the future, but
“until the problems relating to variability and accuracy of testing can be
overcome, the type and level of expenditure cannot be determined.”
While, six respondents reported an increase in staﬀ requirements,
one respondent highlighted a potential negative impact on future em-
ployment. Here, the ‘huge’ increase in operational expenditure was
leading a private waste management company to evaluate the ﬁnancial
viability of their sorting stations, where the absence of tax savings in
combination with the low value of separated materials results could
lead to the plants becoming redundant.
4.3. The 10% LOI threshold
The current 10% LOI limit sets the threshold between the low and
standard tax rates. When asked whether they thought the 10% LOI limit
appropriately represented the characteristics of an inert waste, less than
half (14) of the respondents (n= 33) agreed. Five respondents (all from
group 1) thought it was too low, citing concerns related to the deﬁni-
tion of qualifying ﬁnes. Eight respondents (from both groups) thought it
was too high, noting that ﬁnes with 10% LOI “can still generate sig-
niﬁcant amounts of GHG”. Of the six respondents who cited other
reasons, half highlighted that it focused solely on GHG emissions taking
no account of other factors that inﬂuence toxicity or odour potential.
Others noted that it appeared to penalise recycling and recovery, where
the marked step in tax liabilities at the threshold was viewed as punitive
and failing to reﬂect the eﬀorts made by operators to improve waste
treatment.
4.3.1. Proposed modiﬁcations to the 10% LOI threshold
Respondents’ views on four potential modiﬁcations to the 10% LOI
threshold are presented in Table 3A.
Proposals to either increase or decrease the current threshold were
not widely supported, with around four-ﬁfths of respondents giving a
neutral or negative response. Not unexpectedly, support for these pro-
posals mirrored views on the appropriateness of the threshold, with
those who considered it to be too low or too high favouring an increase
or decrease respectively.
Proposals to replace the sharp threshold with banding (where one or
more additional tax brackets are introduced for ﬁnes with intermediate
LOI) received a mixed response. Around half of the respondents sup-
ported the addition of one extra band, with around a third opposed, and
a sixth neutral. Overall support for multiple bands was somewhat
lower, with a broadly even split between supportive, opposing, and
neutral responses. However, there were signiﬁcant diﬀerences between
the groups, where group 1 supported multiple bands and group 2 op-
posed.
Group 1 viewed banding as a means of removing the perceived
disincentives to material recovery arguing that banding would
strengthen the economic viability of processing operations, and with
one respondent suggesting a sliding tax scale (with an increase in tax
rate on the order of £5 for each percentage point above the threshold)
would be a preferred solution.
For the most part, group 2 did not oppose the principle of banding,
but held concerns regarding the ability to implement it. Respondents
noted that the LOI test is neither precise nor accurate enough to support
banding, and identiﬁed speciﬁc issues with the methodology (e.g.
missing details regarding vessel size, and depth/surface area of the
sample) that further contributed to a high variation in test results
within and between laboratories. Indeed, a number of respondents
highlighted that this variation (reported to be around 2%) leads the
current regime (under which signiﬁcant additional cost is incurred if
the LOI test result is 0.1% over the threshold) to be perceived as unfair,
and suggested that the tax threshold should reﬂect this (un)reliability,
potentially through inclusion of an allowable measurement error.
4.4. Frequency of ﬁnes testing
Test frequency is dependent on previous performance, taking into
account consistency of pre-acceptance checks, outcome of visual in-
spections, and prior LOI results. Respondents were asked to what extent
they agreed that; (1) the test regime is very clear and the testing fre-
quency is easy to determine, and (2) the risk categories used to de-
termine testing frequency are fair (Table 3B).
Around a third of respondents considered the method to be unclear
and/or unfair. Concerns were related to the practicability of the test
regime due to the size of operations and the time delays between de-
livery of waste to site and receiving test results. Respondents also
highlighted that the current regime is open to abuse, indicating that
some operators may discard test results to avoid moving into higher risk
categories (thereby avoiding higher test frequencies and associated
costs).
4.4.1. Proposed modiﬁcations to determination of test frequency
Respondents views on four potential modiﬁcations to the method
for determining test frequency are presented in Table 3C. Only the in-
troduction of a spike allowance received wide support, with less than a
third of respondents supporting the other suggestions.
While it was acknowledged that a ﬁxed number of tests would be
simpler, respondents also noted that it could lead to an increased
overall burden. The risk that a prescribed test schedule would be open
to abuse (e.g. through the provision of compliant but atypical samples)
was also identiﬁed, with one respondent noting “huge savings could be
made from bad practice”.
Proposals to either increase or decrease the number of risk cate-
gories received the least support, where respondents highlighted that
the use of risk categories (even those established) was unworkable due
to the inherent variability of the materials, length of time required to
test a sample, and the poor accuracy and precision of the test.
Around four-ﬁfths of respondents supported the introduction of a
spike allowance, with stronger support (and no opposition) from group.
One opposing respondent from group 2 noted that the introduction of
spike allowances would defeat the object of the LOI testing regime.
However, a respondent from group 1 suggested that a constrained spike
allowance could be built into risk categories, where they considered it
would be reasonable to suggest ﬁnes remained in the lower risk cate-
gory if one in ten samples spiked over 10% by no more than 2% (the
reported level of variation in the accuracy of the LOI test).
4.5. Support for implementation of the LOI testing regime
When asked their views regarding current support for im-
plementation of the LOI testing regime, more than half of the re-
spondents reported that the support was inadequate, with less than a
ﬁfth ﬁnding the support adequate (Table 4A). Dissatisfaction was
higher in group 1, with a clear majority reporting inadequate support.
These respondents perceived a lack of expertise within HMRC regarding
the waste industry and waste related taxes, citing the advocacy of a
poorly deﬁned test method. Furthermore, some respondents considered
that landﬁlling of waste was eﬀectively “unpoliced”, thereby enabling
“cowboy operators” (a term used to refer to dishonest or unscrupulous
operators) to falsely describe material in order to send it to landﬁll as
inert. To address this issue, one respondent suggested that the HMRC
should take the lead in testing more sites to ensure compliance and
consistency.
4.5.1. Proposed modiﬁcations to support for implementation
Respondents’ views on six potential modiﬁcations to enhance the
support provided for implementation of the LOI testing regime are
presented in Table 4B.
The majority of respondents agreed that further support from HMRC
would be of a beneﬁt. However, one respondent stated that the
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guidance was clear and that it was the responsibility of the operator to
understand and comply with all relevant legislation. While this state-
ment of responsibility is indeed correct, it overlooks the key concern
raised by multiple respondents that HMRC was not able to provide
assistance when asked for clariﬁcation regarding the interpretation of
the QFO.
The majority of respondents agreed that simpliﬁed guidance and a
simpliﬁed process would be helpful. For example, respondents sug-
gested that the LOI testing regime could be absorbed into the pre-ac-
ceptance checks, thus making these checks less subjective, and alle-
viating the perceived unfair responsibility placed on landﬁll operators
to determine the correct tax rate. While pre-acceptance checks, transfer
notes and visual inspections are all used to determine tax rate, as one
respondent commented, the landﬁll operator is heavily reliant on the
information provided by the producer, and is therefore reliant on the
producer “being both truthful and being able to ensure operatives
comply with operating procedures each and every day.”
Two thirds of respondents supported the introduction of third party
sampling. Respondents who disagreed noted that it would increase
costs and timescales. While one respondent insisted that self-sampling
was eﬃcient, they also acknowledged that it is open to abuse. Another
commented that there is no need for the extra cost burden “as long as
the ﬁnes are taken to a standardised/accredited Lab and there is the full
ﬂow diagram, photo's etc. to support the production process”.
LOI test standardisation and laboratory accreditation was the most
strongly supported proposal, reﬂecting the concerns raised throughout
the survey regarding the accuracy of the testing regime. Respondents
noted this would negate issues concerning margin of error between
laboratories and address issues related to the ﬁxing of results. It was
also suggested that test providers develop the testing regime so that it
addresses concerns relating to accuracy and reliability, where evalua-
tion of the actual margin of error across all (accredited) testing provi-
ders could be incorporated into a reframing of the LOI limit (i.e.
10%±margin of error).
Two thirds of respondents supported the introduction of tax breaks
for new technology. While one respondent commented that tax breaks
were unnecessary and that technology should be ﬁnanced through re-
duced tax liability, earlier responses from group 1 highlighted that
uncertainty (in producing ﬁnes that qualify for the lower rate of tax)
creates barriers to future investment.
Overall, there was a broadly even split between those who sup-
ported and opposed process endorsement, where the majority of group
1 were supportive and the majority of group 2 were opposed. One re-
spondent suggested that HMRC should approve processes in combina-
tion with third party sampling, with analysts from independent la-
boratories employed to take random, unannounced samples. However,
another respondent (who strongly disagreed) suggested that the focus
should be on how inputs inﬂuence ﬁnes composition. This suggests that
the lack of support for process endorsement may at least partly reﬂect
diﬀering interpretations of what that would entail, as a waste separa-
tion process is typically designed for a speciﬁc input stream.
Nonetheless, the point that inputs exert the primary control on the
composition of the resultant ﬁnes is valid, and if process endorsement
were to be pursued, actual inputs must be taken into account.
4.6. The QFO may act as a barrier to investment
This research has found that the QFO may act as an unintended
barrier to investment in future waste processing, thereby acting contra
to the intended goal of the LFT to promote landﬁll diversion and the
more recent policy imperative to enhance material recovery. Due to the
low value of separated materials, the ﬁnancial viability of processing
can be poor leading some operators to consider closing existing sorting
stations, particularly when anticipated tax savings are not fully realised.
Furthermore, uncertainty concerning the accuracy and reliability of the
LOI testing regime may negatively impact decisions regarding the typeTa
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and level of investment required for advanced processing.
Theoretical scenarios under which the QFO may inﬂuence landﬁll
diversion are illustrated in Fig. 3. In scenario one, active wastes have
the potential to achieve inert classiﬁcation after advanced processing to
remove active material. This provides the greatest potential incentive
for investment due to beneﬁts arising from the signiﬁcantly decreased
disposal costs (reduced tonnage and tax liability of residual ﬁnes), in
addition to the value of the separated material (expected to be low).
However, this incentive depends on the ability to generate a residual
ﬁne with 10% LOI or less. In scenario two (removal of inert material
from active waste), ﬁnancial beneﬁts arise only from the reduction in
tonnage disposed and the value of the separated material, thus pro-
viding a reduced incentive for investment. In scenario three (removal of
active material from inert waste), the ﬁnancial beneﬁts are further re-
duced due to the original low disposal costs, providing little to no in-
centive for advanced processing. In scenario four (removal of inert
material from inert waste), there is a strong disincentive for further
materials recovery due to the risk of residual ﬁnes exceeding the 10%
LOI limit resulting in signiﬁcantly increased disposal costs.
These scenarios clearly illustrate the shortcomings of applying a
sharp boundary between two disparate tax rates at the somewhat ar-
bitrary 10% LOI threshold. Modifying the tax to one based on multiple
bands or a sliding scale has the potential to address this issue,
strengthening the incentive for advanced processing in all cases except
when the LOI of the original material is marginally greater than 10%
and the removal of a small amount of active material would currently
trigger a substantial saving. Amalgamating the various proposals put
forward by respondents suggests some form of gradation in inter-
mediate tax rates between 5% and 20% LOI would incentivise further
separation and alleviate industry concerns that the current tax regime is
punitive with a greater focus on revenue generation than environ-
mental protection. This could be strengthened by combining taxation
with direct incentives for investment, particularly in cases where the
projected return is low or negative, and could potentially be achieved
through recycling tax revenue to provide an enhanced capital allow-
ance on ‘resource eﬃcient technologies’, as is currently available in the
UK for a range of energy and water eﬃcient technologies.
4.7. Clarity is needed regarding responsibility for ﬁnes classiﬁcation and
LOI testing
A number of issues regarding the implementation of the QFO with
respect to the relative responsibilities and liabilities of key stakeholders
were raised. This included the perception that the test regime is vul-
nerable to abuse and concerns over uncertain costs at time of disposal.
At present, the waste processor is required to correctly describe and
classify ﬁnes, where it is the responsibility of the landﬁll operator to
verify the description, complete an LOI test if necessary, and ensure the
correct tax rate is applied. It was suggested that this leaves the landﬁll
operator vulnerable to unscrupulous waste processors (through provi-
sion of an incorrect description), and the system vulnerable to un-
scrupulous landﬁll operators (if results are manipulated), where there
was a perception that the system is virtually unpoliced, with minimal
compliance checks taking place.
In addition, due to the time required to complete an LOI test (up to
three weeks) a situation may arise where ﬁnes are accepted for disposal
as inert and are later reclassiﬁed as active. This risk of change in tax
liability introduces uncertainty into the business models of waste pro-
cessors and landﬁll operators, and with respect to the former may
create a barrier to investment. Furthermore, a failed test result would
require subsequent loads to be tested, where these may already have
been landﬁlled in the time taken to evaluate the earlier load. Such si-
tuations cased the current regime to be described as unworkable.
Absorbing the LOI testing regime into pre-acceptance checks could
provide a solution and would align with other established methods of
classiﬁcation. For example, to determine hazardous status of a waste,
the material is tested at least twice a month against sixteen (hazardous)
properties before it can be moved, disposed of, or recovered
(Environmental Agency EA, 2015). Determined on a 24-sample rolling
basis, the material is deemed hazardous if more than ﬁve properties
exceed the relevant limit or if one property limit is exceeded four times
or more (Environmental Agency EA, 2015). Employing routine testing
Fig. 3. Level of (dis)incentive to invest in advanced processing of ﬁnes taking into account current landﬁll tax implications of both the input waste and the residual
ﬁnes.
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where classiﬁcation is determined on a rolling-basis would provide a
greater level of certainty regarding ﬁnes classiﬁcation prior to disposal,
with the responsibility of correct classiﬁcation squarely placed with the
producers. Furthermore, it could be argued that this would better re-
present the ﬁnes being produced over time and be more consistent in
classiﬁcation.
4.8. The LOI test regime is currently not ﬁt for purpose
Meaningful discussions regarding the operational procedures of the
QFO are contingent upon an LOI test regime that is ﬁt for purpose and
adequately represents the characteristics of qualifying ﬁnes. With re-
gard to the latter point, while the use of LOI as a sole measure of en-
vironmental burden was questioned, it is noted that it does reﬂect a key
driver of landﬁll diversion (GHG emission reduction) and it is the au-
thors view that immediate priority should be given to improving the
LOI test regime.
Throughout the survey, respondents repeatedly emphasised that the
LOI test is severely limited, being both inaccurate and imprecise. The
validity of a standardised test is dependent on the reproducibility of
results, both within and between laboratories (Geurts et al., 2016).
While LOI is often used in soil analysis due to its simplicity and cost-
eﬀectiveness, it is generally considered to provide only a crude in-
dication of organic content where test accuracy is known to be aﬀected
not only by the sample clay content, but also by a range of procedural
details (Hoogsteen et al., 2015; Wang et al., 2011). In addition to the
inherent limitations of the test and the failure of the QFO to specify key
procedural parameters (thereby leaving it open to interpretation by
diﬀerent test providers), the method and frequency with which samples
are obtained has also been criticized for being open to bias and failing
to represent the material being landﬁlled. These limitations could be
mitigated by developing a stringent test regime, with little or no room
for interpretation, accrediting test providers, and employing third party
independent sampling.
5. Conclusions
For waste policy to be eﬀective, particularly in the context of
driving the transition to a CE, it should be balanced; providing the
correct amount of sanction and incentive to enhance resource recovery
while ensuring innovation and investment in progressive waste man-
agement strategies is not stiﬂed. Employing a stakeholder-oriented
approach, this study has illustrated an example of un-balanced policy,
where secondary legislation (the QFO) introduced to address a speciﬁc
issue (ﬁnes classiﬁcation) has had an unintended negative impact on
the principal aim of the primary legislation (the UK LFT) to increase
landﬁll diversion. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that the QFO has created a
perverse incentive to decrease landﬁll diversion through limiting the
recovery of secondary materials (underpinning principle of CE) and
discouraging investment in technology (required for transition to CE).
While this study found a number of stakeholder dissatisﬁers had
undermined implementation of the QFO, most notably the complexity
of (and missing details in) the QFO guidance and a perceived lack of
support from (an unknowledgeable) HMRC, the most critical factors
identiﬁed were related to policy design. Here, the process for de-
termining the classiﬁcation of ﬁnes and the discontinuity in disposal
costs were both identiﬁed as major weaknesses with negative impacts
on environmental protection, proﬁtability, and investment in tech-
nology. These ﬁndings highlight both the importance of policy co-
ordination when multiple constraints are present, and the insights that
stakeholders can provide (while acknowledging that these will in-
evitably reﬂect vested interests) regarding the design and im-
plementation of market-based policy instruments.
With respect to the classiﬁcation of ﬁnes, the current process was
found to be open to interpretation and abuse (leading to variation in
and misclassiﬁcation of ﬁnes), and was viewed as unworkable and
unfair. This arose from a division of responsibility between the pro-
ducer and the landﬁll operator, an apparent lack of compliance checks,
the time lapse between load delivery and receipt of LOI test results, and
a poorly described LOI test regime that is open to sampling bias, lacks
methodological details and fails to take account of the inherent lim-
itations of LOI testing. With respect to the discontinuity in disposal
costs, the sharp boundary in tax rates at the 10% LOI threshold was not
only found to be a blunt instrument for promoting landﬁll diversion,
but one which actively dis-incentivises material recovery leading to a
cessation in current separation practices and acting as a barrier to in-
vestment in new separation technologies.
To address these issues, the following recommendations are made.
First, priority must be given to the development of a robust LOI test
method with fully deﬁned operational parameters. This should include
an assessment of reproducibility within and between testing labora-
tories in order to determine an appropriate measurement tolerance that
can be taken into account when classifying ﬁnes for tax purposes.
Second, it is recommended that the balance of responsibility for ﬁnes
classiﬁcation is shifted to the waste processor, with LOI determined on
a rolling basis and incorporated into pre-acceptance checks (similar to
hazardous waste classiﬁcation). Sampling frequency should be based on
risk categories that reﬂect the composition of input wastes, the pro-
cesses employed, and the consistency of LOI test results, with third-
party sampling and/or regular compliance checks to protect the system
from abuse. Third, the 10% LOI threshold should be replaced by mul-
tiple tax bands or a sliding scale and ideally would be combined with a
direct incentive for investment such as an enhanced capital allowance
for resource eﬃcient technologies. At a minimum, it is imperative that
the current strong disincentive for recovering inert material is re-
dressed.
As a ﬁnal note, it is emphasised that explicit consideration must be
given to the interaction between environment and technology during
the policy design process in order to ensure that the continued evolu-
tion of waste management policy is eﬀective.
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